This paper studies the determinants of real wage rates using data on Canadian labour contracts signed between 1978 and 1984.
Introduction
The wage rate is often seen as one of the most important prices in the economy. It shapes the distribution of income, the levels of employment and
In part because of such dissatisfaction, a newer tradition has recently emerged.
Work by Newell and Symons (1985) , Layard and Nickell (1986) , Nickell (1987) , Carruth and Oswald (1987) and others at the London School of Economics has attempted to estimate a real wage equation.
The unemployment rate is taken as a key independent variable in this form of equation. According to this new approach, the unemployment rate is not a measure of excess demand or supply which affects the speed of wage adjustment during disequilibrium.
Instead, it shapes the real wage in equilibrium by influencing the relative bargaining strength of firms and workers (or unions) . For this reason, unemployment has a long run effect on 2 the level of real wages. A more complete formal statement of this approach is contained in the Appendix.
In a later section we examine empirically both the Phillips Curve and this, more recent, hypothesis on the role of unemployment. Previous work of this kind goes back to Sargan's (1964) pioneering study and includes Newell and Symons (1986) , who study the roles of tax and price 'wedges' and nominal rigidity using UK data.
In contrast, this paper estimates real wage change equations and focuses upon the issue of whether it is unemployment or its rate of change which enters such equations with a negative sign -see Vanderkamp (1972) . Unlike Newell and Symons (1986) , who use aggregate data, we rely on data drawn from individual wage agreements signed in the Canadian unionised sector between 1978-1984. A second question of interest is whether wage rates are determined in part by product prices.
To quote from a key, but routinely over-looked, passage in Dunlop (1944, p. 146) , ".. .The central theme is that declines in product prices and not unemployment constitute the effective downward pressure on wage structures."
This idea contradicts the much more recent belief of wage rigidity in the face of sectoral price movements.
Implicit contract theory (e.g., Baily (1974) , Gordon (1974) and Azariadis (1975) ), efficiency wage theory (e.g., Solow (1979) , Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , and Yellen (1984) ) and some trade union models (e.g., McDonald and Solow (1981) ) all bear upon the flexibility of pay in the face of product price changes. Wage rigidity theorems along such lines have become a routine part of modern economic theory. Yet not only do they differ radically from the beliefs of post-war labour economists, but they are also largely untested1. However, contract data See, however, Brown (1982) and Martinello (1988) .
allow the wage rigidity hypothesis to be evaluated in a straightforward way.
The industry's price can be entered as an explanatory variable in a contract wage equation. In this context, simultaneity bias should be minimal because of the micro nature of the dependent variable and because some of the regressors are firm specific --see Kennan (1988) .
The analysis of so-called insider-outsider theories -stressed recently by Solow (1985) , Blanchard and Sumisers (1986) , Gregory (1986) , Lindbeck and Snower (1986) and Gottfries and Horn (1987) , among others--suggests that movements in wages are governed more by internal pressure than external pressure. In contrast to the theory of competitive labour markets, this branch of labour market theory implies that a firm's pay depends principally upon its own employment changes and product market characteristics. In this literature, aggregate unemployment has little or no effect on the real wage rate. Instead, it depends on lagged employment and demand shift variables2.
The three strands of literature surveyed in this section can be investigated using the framework outlined in the Appendix. As indicated there, firms and unions are assumed to maximize the weighted product of their utilities above their faliback positions with respect to employment and the wage rate. This process results in an equation for the wage rate which depends on the alternative wage rate, union membership, the average 2 Slanchard and Summers (1986, p.1e3) write "...it seems reasonable to expect that a reduction in the number of incumbent workers will lead to the setting of higher wage.. ." while Solow (1985, p.347) Nevertheless, these programmes may have had an impact on wage determination in the private sector, a possibility which is considered in section 4.
agreement.
The Consumer Price Index is included in the original data and has a base of 1971 -100. This is used both to deflate nominal magnitudes and as variable c in the Appendix. Real wage rates evaluated at the end of the previous contract are denoted by (-I). Industry product price indices were obtained from the 1986 Cansim tape and were appended to the contract data -they set 1981 -100. The demand shift variable (z) was proxied by real industry GOP5. A federal controls dummy variable is also contained in the original Labour Canada tape.
In order to implement the discussion of section 2 and the Appendix, it is necessary to specify the ingredients of the alternative wage rate (u).
This is assumed to be a function of the regional wage rate (r) , defined as average weekly earnings in the same province and SIC classification, the statutory amount of unemployment insurance available to a worker in the region and year, the statutory duration of that benefit level and the regional unemployment rate6. The regional unemployment rates used are contained in the original Labour Canada tape.
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To each contract was assigned the real GDP (1971 dollars) generated in the same industry (ten industries are distinguished) in the year in which the previous contract became effective. Source: Economic
Review, Ottawa, Department of Finance, 1985. 6 The average weekly earnings data is available from the Cansim tape. The unemployment insurance benefit and duration data were obtained The greater the elasticity of indexation, the smaller the need to front-load wage increases. For a given number of wage revisions7, the longer the contract's duration and the greater the expected annual inflation rate, the greater the need to set a high real wage rate at the start of a contract. Given that the real wage rate variable on the data tape is measured at the beginning of the contract, it is necessary to augment equation (A.7) to take account of these issues.
Thus the average -j elasticity of indexation over the current contract, the length of the contract itself and the expected annual inflation rate are included in our empirical equations below.
These variables are part of the original Labour Canada tape. The coefficients on the expected annual inflation rate and contract duration should be positive, while that on the elasticity of indexation should be negative.
No information on this variable is available in this particular sample otherwise this would have been a useful additional regressor with an expected negative coefficient. See Christofides (1982) for further discussion of this issue.
Descriptive statistics on the main variables are reported in Table I. 4.
Emoirical Results
Tables 2 and 3 report our empirical results. In order to deal with possible fixed effects, contract-to-contract time differences in the logarithms of most variables were used. Of the original 1015 records on the Labour Canada tape many were lost in tha differencing. Several records were first contracts and these were, therefore, lost. Nevertheless, a large sample of 595 observations remained. Tables 2 and 3 retain a constant term in order to allow for possible trends in the level equations.
Similar results were obtained when constants were excluded8.
Column I, Table 2 , reports an equation corresponding to equation (A.7)
in the Appendix. As Dunlop (1944) would have predicted, industry prices and CDP have positive signs and are statistically significant at the 5Z level.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that workers share in product market prosperity.
The regional unemployment rate is also statistically significant at the 51 level and has an elasticity of -0.069. We interpret this as an unemployment effect on workers bargaining strength. When outside opportunities worsen, workers wages inside the firm are depressed.
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To the extent that the error terms in the level equations are white noise, the error terms in the change equations are MA(l) and some efficiency gains remain unexploited. Realizing these gains is bedevilled by the unbalanced nature of the sample which results from varying contract lengths. Some preliminary work suggests that the MA(l) structure appears to be weak.
9
The variable which indicates the presence of wage controls in public sector contracts signed between 1982Q3-l984Q2 is significant, suggesting small effects on private sector wage agreements. The regional wage rate (r) is statistically significant at the 5% level and has an elasticity of 0.133.
However, the signs on the UI benefit variables are somewhat puzzling; it is conceivable that this is because of multicollinearity with regional unemployment9.
This argument is consistent with the results reported in column 2, Table 2 . When the benefit variables are dropped, the coefficient and t statistic on the regional unemployment rate increase substantially in absolute size. Column 3, Table 2 , introduces the variables discussed on p.
8 above.
The elasticity of indexation, contract duration and the expected inflation rate all have the expected signs, sizeable coefficients and are statistically significant at the 5% level. The real wage rate prevailing at the end of the previous contract has the expected sign and is significant at the 5% level, but its effect is small. The addition of these "accounting"
variables and the past real wage rate improves considerably the fit of the equation: the adjusted R2 jumps from 0.476 in column 1 to 0.708 in column 3, Table 2 . Given the cross-sectional nature of much of the data, this is a satisfactory fit.
Column 3, Table 2 shows that the significance of the industry GDP variable is substantially reduced; the coefficients on and the
The simple correlation coefficients between the change in the logarithms of UI Benefits, UI Benefit Duration and the regional unemployment rate are 0.13 and 0.78 respectively. We chose not to combine the statutory information on unemployment insurance variables into a single variable in order to avoid imposing a constraint.
statistical significance of other variables are not substantially affected10.
Columns 4 and 5, Table 2 , begin an exploration of the issue of whether it is the change or the level of the regional unemployment rate that affects real wage change. It is clear that the level does not perform nearly as well as the change in the regional unemployment rate, a fact which is inconsistent with the standard Phillips curve model. Column 5, Table 2 confirms the effects of multicollinearity between the benefit and unemployment rate variables: relative to column 4, It is clear that the change-on-level specification produces 10 To the extent that our industry product price variable measures the average industry product price with an error, the estimated coefficients underestimate the true ones. coefficients11 and t ratios which sit reasonably well with the Phillips curve approach.
However, there is no doubt that these specifications are dominated by the change-on-change equations of columns 2 and 5, Table 3 . This is confirmed in the encompassing equations of the same table. It is noteworthy, however, that the equations in Table 3 are not as successful as those of Table 2 .
Returning to the latter, columns 6 and 7 check on some implications of the insider/outsider literature. The change in the logarithm of the lagged employment variable12 is not statistically significant, and has a positive sign --contrary to the expectation of Blanchard and Summers (1986) .
In addition, the exclusion of the unemployment variables damages the overall goodness of fit. This is to be expected, of course, given the consistently useful role played by the change in the unemployment rate variable.
The final column of Table 2 omits the variables which proxy the impact of the business cycle on firms in particular industries13 . The product price variable is particularly robust and statistically significant at the 5% level and its omission is clearly inappropriate. Dunlop's (1944) hypothesis thus appears to be consistent with these results, though the results also suggest a role for unemployment. These findings may also be These are -0.015 (2.14) and -0.070 (7.42) in columns 1 and 4, Table   3 respectively.
12 Note that simultaneity is avoided by use of the employment level at the beginning of the previous contract. consistent with the ideas proposed in Solow (1985) . However, the estimated equations do not favour the wage rigidity predictions discussed earlier. Tables 2 and 3 were re-estimated using the regional unemployment rate prevailing during the quarter in which an agreement became effectiverather than the rate prevailing during the quarter in which the previous agreement expired. The results obtained were similar to those discussed above and are, therefore, not reported. Several other variables, which proved to be not terribly useful, were also considered. These include the industrial relations stage at which an agreement was reached, the size of the union and a dummy variable which assumed the value of unity for unions which signed more than arbitrary numbers of contracts.
5.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to uncover the factors which shape the There are three principal conclusions. First, the real wage rate at the microeconomic level is inversely related to the unemployment rate in the employer's region. Estimates of the unemployment elasticity of wages ranged between -0.04 and -0.13. Only limited support was found for the traditional approach in which wage changes depend upon the unemployment level; it appears that the level of the real wage rate depends more strongly and reliably upon the level of the unemployment rate. Second, there is strong evidence in favour of Dunlop's (1944) hypothesis that real wage 13 movements are sensitive to real product price changes14. This is consistent with recent ideas (eg. Solow (1985) ) concerning how 'insiders' convert demand shocks into higher pay, but is inconsistent with the wage rigidity proposition of implicit contract theory and of other models of pay inflexibility. Third, current contract wages do not appear to depend negatively upon the level of employment in the previous contract.
If anything, this relationship was weakly positive.
These results are consistent with the view that collective bargaining may be seen as a process of rent-sharing.
When an industry has high selling prices, its workers benefit in the form of higher real earnings.
High unemployment in the outside labour market, however, acts to weaken workers' bargaining power. The greater the unemployment rate, the lower the real wage.
14 New work, on British panel data, by Nickell and Wadhwarii (1987) also identifies a product price effect, although the authors interpret it somewhat differently. Carruth, Oswald and Findlay (1986) Dunlop (1944) . Survey discussions of these issues are available in Oswald (1985) and Pencavel (1985) .
The alternative or outside wage, , may itself depend upon a number of variables. It is assumed that it can be written as -w(r, b, d, U) (A.3) in which r is the regional wage rate, b is the unemployment benefit, d is 15 the duration of the unemployment benefit and U is the unemployment rate in the region. Hence w is to be thought of as a function of the level of pay in the firm's own geographical area, and also of the level of income if jobs cannot be found, namely of the unemployment benefit level. The probability of finding work at rate r, rather than being unemployed at rate b, depends upon the prevailing unemployment rate U.
It is convenient to follow the common practice of assuming that bargaining can be modelled using the Nash (1953) solution. This can be
given an axiomatic justification or may be justified by appealing to a noncooperative game theoretic framework, in which the two sides are allowed to make alternating offers -see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) .
Assume that wages and employment are chosen to solve the problem:
in which V and r are, respectively, the union's utility and the firm's utility in the event of a delay in settlement. The constant y is assumed to lie between zero and unity. In fact -y may itself be a function of other variables; it may, for instance, depend on whether wage controls are in place --the possibility that incomes policy affects the real wage is explored in the empirical section.
If there is a breakdown in negotiations, the two agents receive only their delay utilities (denoted by a ).
Bargaining power stems from the ability to enjoy a relatively large delay utility. In the case of the firm it is assumed that --k , (A.5) namely, that during a disagreement the firm receives no revenue, and has no labour costs to pay, but must cover its fixed costs. The union's members may find work temporarily during a stoppage. Therefore it is assumed that V -V(r, n, b, in, U, c) (A.6)
Employees are not paid a wage by the firm during a dispute but may find work at pay level r. Unemployment, U, affects the probability of workers doing so. It is plausible to assume that V is a declining function of U. On this view workers' bargaining ability is weakened by outside unemployment.
The Nash bargaining problem then maximizes expression (A.4) using 
